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The Spanish Civil War is considered to be one of the most significant events in the in-
ter-war period. Interestingly, the events between 1936 and 1939 reflect not only the for-
mulation of power politics in Europe, but also the aims of the Irish1 government in diplo-
matic terms. Irish participation in the Spanish Civil War attracted considerable attention 
recently. However, the Iberian events were not given primary importance in the history of 
Irish foreign policy. Anglo-Irish relations and the concept of Irish neutrality during and 
after the Second World War have been the key issues. Although it is a well-known fact in 
Irish historical circles that the overwhelming majority of the Irish population was support-
ing Franco because of religious reasons, other aspects such as the Irish government's ad-
herence to non-intervention and the motivations behind it are mostly ignored. So I am 
inclined to think that it is worth examining the Irish reaction to the Spanish Civil War in 
its entirety; that is, paying attention to the curiosity of non-intervention as well. This is 
more than interesting as the "Irishmen were not, as yet, intervening in Spain; but few were 
neutral."2 
In order to provide an insight into Irish public opinion, I based my research partly on 
the reports of contemporary Dublin-centred Irish daily newspapers, namely the 'conserva-
tive' Irish Independent, the 'republican' Irish Press and the 'liberal' Irish Times. All three 
took different stands on the Spanish Civil War. They showed great interest in Spanish 
events from the outbreak of the war and published news coverage and reports every day in 
the first one and a half year of the conflict. It was only after the end of 1937 that these 
became less frequent. 
Irish public opinion as well as political circles may be classified into three groups: pro-
Franco, pro-Republican, and those on the side of non-intervention. I am going to give an 
insight on Irish reactions to the Spanish Civil War via these groups. The first part of my 
study will focus on Franco's Irish supporters, describing the main tendencies that moti-
vated the certain pro-Nationalist groups. The second part will be based on outlining pro-
Republican Irish responses to the Spanish Civil War, presenting the special character of 
Irish republicanism as well. The third section is devoted to non-interventionists. 
' The official name of the country between 1922 and 1937 was the Irish Free State, then the Consti-
tution changed it to Eire. The title of the prime minister changed similarly; in 1937 the President of 
the Executive Council became to be called Taoiseach. 
2 J. Bowyer Bell, "Ireland and the Spanish Civil War," Studia Hibernica 9 (1969), 149. 
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The Irish Supporters of Spanish Nationalists 
Due to the tragic nature of news coining from Spain, the vast majority of the Irish pub-
lic opinion sympathized with the Insurgents. The main reason for this was the fact that the 
articles and news coverage of the Irish Independent focused on the losses of the Spanish 
Church and clericals in general. The Independent was the organ of the nationalist Catholic 
middle-class, influenced by the ideas of the Catholic Church. With reference to the Span-
ish Civil War, the paper held a strict religious view and thus backed the Nationalist cause. 
It was appreciated in conservative circles abroad as well; an Englishman, for instance, 
wished to "pay special tribute to the Irish Independent for the line it had taken in thè 
Spanish crisis [because] it has been as Christian as [British] Catholic newspapers. The 
Irish Press is rather more like the English papers, with the honourable exception of the 
Daily ΜαίΓ3. On the other hand, the supporters of the Republican side often criticized the 
motivation and attitude of the paper. The well-known IRA man from the War of Inde-
pendence, Ernie O'Malley argued that "the action of the Independent is a political one. It 
has no regard for Spain"4. 
There was no wonder that the stories of tortured nuns and burnt churches caused heavy 
religious anxiety among the overwhelmingly Catholic Irish population. Besides up-to-date 
reports, several series of articles were published in the Irish Independent. These dealt al-
most exclusively with the "Red menace"; the idealistic past of Spain ("IN WAR-TORN 
SPAIN - HISTORIC SALAMANCA VISITED); or the "TRUTH OF SPAIN". The "Our 
Readers' Views" section of the paper contained lots of Spanish topics as well. For in-
stance on 19 August 1936 it dealt with "THE RED TERROR IN SPAIN", while on 2 De-
cember 1936 it was published under the subtitle "IRELAND, SPAIN AND COMMU-
NISM". Similar series appeared after 22 September 1936 as well; this was "THE TRUTH 
ABOUT COMMUNISM". Its subtitle, "A FIERCE HATRED OF RELIGION" was very 
telling. 
The supporters of General Franco comprised of all who alleged to "stand for the an-
cient faith and the traditions of Spain are behind the present revolt against the Marxist 
regime in Madrid."5 Hence they were motivated by religious and not political factors in 
the first place. They regarded Franco as the defender of faith and religion. This is why the 
Irish Catholic Church also raised its voice on the side of the Nationalists both from the 
altars and in the Catholic press as well. Since there was no deep commitment towards de-
mocracy6 within the Church, the clergy could not be convinced by reminding them of the 
official politics adopted by the Vatican. The Primate of All-Ireland, Cardinal MacRory 
had a major role in the establishment of the Irish Brigade, by suggesting the recruitment of 
an 'Irish crusade' to help Spanish Nationalists. On 21 September he urged medical aid for 
3 Irish Independent, 26 September 1936. 
4 Mike Cronin and John M. Regan, Ireland: The Politics of Independence, 1922-1949 (London-
Macmillan, 2000), 82. 
5 Irish Independent, 22 July 1936. 
6 Fearghal McGany, Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War (Cork: Cork University Press, 1999), 
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Spain: "We should all pray for Spain and, if able to, we should all help from our purses, 
help her obtain war supplies - what I should say is medical supplies for her sick and 
wounded. I do not want to say anything about other kind of help. As Christians, if we are 
able, we should be prepared to render that help to her"7. Pastorals between 1936 and 1939 
often referred to the events in Spain, always in favour of the Nationalists. A Galway 
priest, for instance, declared that "every man who fights for Caballero, Lenin, Trotzky, or 
Marx are fighting against Christ and for the devil"8. 
The main reason for supporting the Insurgents was thus the defence of the faith, which 
was closely related to the exaggeration of the communist threat. As the biggest party of 
the Opposition, Fine Gael worded their fears, "Mexico yesterday, Spain today, Ireland 
tomorrow".9 The Irish Independent's readers' views were very similar to this; as one of 
them remarked, "Spain was a great Catholic country, but the communists had got a hold 
there: the same thing could happen in Ireland if the people were not careful"10. So the pa-
per regarded the events in Spain serving as a "LESSON FOR IRELAND" because "they 
should burn into our very souls an abhorrence of Bolshevism in every shape and form. 
They should steel us to rigid determination to have no truck or truce with its crafty agents 
or its lying and insidious propaganda"11. 
It was not only the growing power and influence of the Soviet Union that worried the 
Opposition, but more importantly the spread of certain communist ideas, including athe-
ism. That is to say, Catholicism for the Irish - unlike many European states - did not 
stand for old, feudal concepts but was much more deeply rooted in their traditions and 
everyday lives. Nevertheless, Eoin O'Dufly overemphasized the "red menace" and the 
leader of the Irish government, Eamon de Valera recognized this. In his opinion the 
Communist threat was exaggerated even in 1932, when he came to power with Fianna 
Fáil. But since then, as he said, they had seen "a gradual waning of the little strength that 
communism had"12 in the country. This is why the government did not bring anti-
Communist measures in legislation. 
Shared historical ties were also one of the most frequently cited arguments for the pro-
Nationalist side, going back as far as the Elizabethan era.13 However, Alexander J. 
McCabe, the rector of the Irish College in Salamanca, despised the exaggeration of his-
torical links between the countries; as he put it, "if some of the people on the side of 
Franco read the history of Ireland from the days of O'Connell, Davis and Davitt they 
would regard us as very red"14. This is an argument to consider, as McCabe was closely 
7 Irish Press, 21 September, 1936. 
8 Ibid., 1 March 1937. 
9 J. Bowyer Bell, "Ireland and the Spanish Civil War," Studia Hibernica 9 (1969), 145. 
10 Irish Independent, 25 September, 1936. 
11 Ibid., 14 September, 1936. 
12 Dermot Keogh, Ireland and Europe, 1919-48 (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1988), 78. 
13 Namely, after the Battle of Kinsale the Catholic Irish intelligentsia and nobility under the leader-
ship of Hugh O'Neill fled from the Protestant English rule to Spain and found political asylum 
there. See Judith Keene, Fighting for Franco. International Volunteers in Nationalist Spain during 
the Spanish Civil War, 1936-39 (London: Leicester University Press, 2001), 116. 
14 Keogh (1988), 71. 
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related to the heavily anti-Republican Irish Christian Front (ICF); his statement that 
"thanks to Hitler, the Communists were driven back from Germany, thanks to Mussolini 
they were kept from Italy, and thanks to Franco, they will never come to Ireland"15, 
clearly illustrates his attitude. Despite this he still managed to word his opinion without 
bias. In addition to shared historical ties, the supporters of Nationalists (in this case, a Fine 
Gael member) often referred to the crusades and compared them with the Irish Brigade, 
saying that "there was no difference between the young Irishmen who at present go to 
fight for Christianity in Spain and the Crusaders who went from all over Europe to fight 
for Christianity in the Holy Land"16. 
The most significant Irish supporters of the Insurgents were the members of the semi-
Fascist Blueshirt organization17 on the one hand and the Irish Christian Front (ICF) on the 
other. But as they had different opinion for the nature of the help for the Spanish, the pro-
Nationalist Irish population was far from being united for the cause. What is more, the 
Blueshirts themselves were also split on the eve of the Spanish Civil War18. According to 
Ned Cronin, the leader of the League of Youth, "the Irish Brigade [had] as much prospect 
of reaching Saragossa as it [had] of reaching the moon".19 So it was not surprising that 
Cronin also tried to organize Irish support for Spanish Nationalists, although he imagined 
a different kind of help. He "suggested the formation of a national fund [...] to provide 
medical aid and other assistance for the Spanish rebels, so far as such assistance was not 
rendered impossible by the 'non-intervention' pact"20. So it was more similar to the aims 
of the ICF than to O'Duffy's. 
In addition to the conflict with Cronin, O'Duffy and his Blueshirts' relationship with 
Patrick Belton's ICF21 was neither unclouded. The latter body was organized after the 
outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in order to "help the stricken people of Spain in their 
struggle against the forces of international communism"22, but according to Stradling, 
"they had nothing to do with Spain but aimed to initiate and co-ordinate anti-communist 
15 Irish Independent, 26 October, 1936. 
16 Keogh (1988), 84. 
17 In the early and mid-thirties, the Free State - similarly to the majority of European states - also 
witnessed the emergence of extremists, though to a much smaller extent. The pro-Fascist O'Dufly, 
after he was dismissed from the leadership of the Garda Siochána (the Irish police force), joined thè 
Army Comrades Association (АСА, later renamed to the National Guard, NG, and afterwards to the 
League Of Youth) and turned the body into a proto-Fasci st, military group, who were publicly 
known as the Blueshirts. Inspired by Mussolini and the Italian Marcia Su Roma, in August 1933, 
O'Dufïy organized a public meeting and a march which would have passed the Irish parliament 
buildings. In the end it was banned and the NG was proscribed. So the Blueshirts represented only a 
minor section of the right-wing 'opposition' (they were not yet present in the Dáil), but surprisingly 
enough, they were the ones to participate in the Spanish Civil War. 
18 As a result of the Blueshirt-split, two groups emerged; one under the leadership of Ned Cronin 
(League of Youth), the other led by Eoin O'Duffy, called the National Corporate Party (NCP). 
19 Robert Stradling, The Irish and the Spanish Civil War, 1936-39 (Manchester: Manchester Univer-
sity Press, 1999), 12. 
20 Irish Times, 22 August 1936. 
21 The ideology of the movement was based on anti-Communism and corporatism. 
22 Irish Independent, 22 August, 1936. 
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activity in the Free State"23. Stradling's opinion is closer to that of the left-wing republi-
can contemporaries of Belton. They declared that "the so-called Christian Front is a dis-
guised Fascist organization, a puppet of the Independent newspaper trust and is in under-
hand league with General O'Duffy and his Fascist party [and] that this combination [... ] is 
shamelessly and recklessly trying to use the name of religion to further the rise of the dis-
credited Fascist groups in Ireland"24. So they may be considered significant in terms of 
domestic policy as Belton wanted to use his organization most importantly against the 
Irish government. However, Belton's republican/socialist contemporary, Peadar 
O'Donnell argued that Belton gave his movement "some touch of a non-political appear-
ance . 
The ICF did not approve of O'Duffy's plans about military intervention into Spanish 
affairs; Belton rather fancied humanitarian aid. Thus collections were organized on Sun-
days after masses, as a result of which more than L 30,000 was raised, solely on 25 Octo-
ber, 1936.26 In terms of public support, the movement can be considered as a success but 
not regarding its main objective, since they managed neither to introduce corporatism in 
Ireland, nor to make the de Valera government abandon their non-intervention policy. The 
Irish Independent always commented positively on the ICF; regarded their meetings of 15 
November 1936 in Limerick and Roscommon as "magnificent demonstrations"27. 
The leader of the military supporters of General Franco was Eoin O'Duffy. Both his 
contemporaries28 and many historians29 had a low opinion on him, and his role at the birth 
of the Irish Free State, his active work as Garda Commissioner and his achievements in 
Irish sports life as the head of the Gaelic Athletic Association have been neglected.30 Sev-
eral factors motivated O'Duffy to organize the Irish Brigade. Stradling, by stressing the 
concept of crusades, states that the Brigade was not brought into existence for political 
reasons but for defending Catholic faith.31 O'Duffy himself also declared that he had 
"ceased all social and political manifestations, and [had] concentrated on one thing alone 
- on helping the cause of Christian Spain"32. In contrast, Augusteijn lists other factors as 
23 Stradling (1999), 12. 
24 Irish Press, 16 September 1936. 
25 Peadar O'Donnell, Salud! An Irishman in Spain (London, 1937), 240. 
26 On the subject of donations, funds, and the collected sums, see Keogh (1988), 72-77. 
27 Irish Independent, 16 November 1936. 
28 A Swiss journalist called O'Dufiy 'marionett-like', the Round Table correspondent described him 
as 'our Irish Don Quixote', while in Salamanca he was considered as the 'queer fellow'. See Keene 
(2001), 115. 
29 Hugh Thomas refers to the Brigade as „O'Duffy's ill-fated blue shirts ", while Mark Cronin calls 
their intervention as a „comical excursion to Spain". See ibid. 
30 On the relationship between Blueshirts and sports, see Mike Cronin, "Blueshirts, sports and so-
cials," History Ireland 2/3 (1994): 43-47. Here the author stresses the importance of the movement 
as a social mobilizing force. 
31 Stradling (1999), 109. 
32 Irish Independent, 21 November 1936. 
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well that could make O'Dufly assemble his volunteers.33 These include his commitment 
to fascism34 but first and foremost his marginalization in Irish politics. 
The most common reasons for volunteering in the Brigade were anti-communism, re-
ligious sentiments, fascist ideology or spirit of adventure. Gertrude Gaffhey, the reporter 
of the Independent, provided an idealized picture of them when she alleged that "85% of 
them went because they thought it was up to them to fight for the Faith"35. In the end an 
Irish brigade of 670 members joined the Spanish Nationalist Army. They formed the Fif-
teenth Bandera (Battalion) of the Tercio (Foreign Legion), which lay under the leadership 
of Yagiie. The Brigade had its own officers, cooks, doctors, priest, Spanish adjutants, and 
interpreters. They all were under the direction of O'Duffy, who was appointed as Inspec-
tor-General, owing responsibility only to Franco. The recruitment began soon after the 
General's proposal of 10 August; the first office in charge was opened on 15 August in 
Cashel and was followed by many others. 
The majority of volunteers were from a rural background, both from the Free State 
(Tipperary, Kerry, Limerick, that is the middle- and south-western counties) and the 
Catholic population of the Six Counties (Longford, Monaghan and West-Belfast).36 Not 
all of them were Blueshirts; some came from a republican or even a worker background. 
Though many of them said that they were free from political motives, they admitted feel-
ing hostility towards Fianna Fáil and the IRA.37 About one third of them came from 
farmer families; in addition the number of former soldiers and gardai. 
Problems arose later because of the inadequate leadership of the Brigade. This was be-
cause O'Dufly appointed almost exclusively his own men that were faithful to him: Pat-
rick Dalton as field commander, Sean Cunningham as second in command, Tom Hyde as 
commander with himself and the anti-Semitic Thomas Gunning as his secretary. The latter 
was the only one to speak Spanish among them.38 
The Irish volunteers were to face other difficulties before action as well. Firstly, they 
did not manage to embark on 16 October, 1936 near Waterford, owing to the work of the 
Non-intervention Committee. Only later in mid-October did 700 volunteers left from 
Galway. The Irish Press gave an account of O'Dufly leaving Dublin with 40 of his men 
on 21 November, while due to the Independent "50 MORE IRISHMEN [WERE HEAD-
ING] FOR SPAIN". The latter reported the departure of another 84 volunteers on 28 No-
vember, all of whom "were presented with miraculous medals, Sacred Heart badges, and 
prayer books"39. Another considerable-sized group (according to the Irish Independent, 
with 693 members40) left on 13 December, again from Galway on the board of the Ger-
man Domingo. The military training of the Irish Brigade took place in Cáceres, where 
33 Joost Augusteijn, Ireland in the 1930s: New Perspectives (Dublin: Four Courts, 2001), 126-7. 
On 10 August, 1936 he made the following statement to the Independent. ,Д these atrocities are 
carried out in the name of democracy, than the sooner fascism triumphs, the better " 
35 Stradling (1999), 52. 
36 Keene (2001), 119. 
37 Augusteijn (1999), 132. 
38 Keene (2001), 121. 
39 Irish Independent, 28 November 1936. 
40 Ibid, 14 December 1936. 
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they stayed till February 1937. Here they attended mass every Sunday; this piousness as-
tonished local people as this was very different from the attitude of the Spanish soldiers. 
Besides the disappointment with the nature of devoutness in Spain, several other factors 
made their presence in Cáceres more difficult. In addition to language problems, they had 
to face other difficulties as well. As a volunteer from Kerry said, they "were given no de-
cent food or clothing and received hard bread and black coffee each day"41. However, 
alcohol caused the greatest difficulties. The Irish consumed too much wine which they 
were not used to, as a result they got drunk very often and this outraged the majority of 
the Spanish42. Gafiney, the reporter of the Independent commented on the question of 
alcohol from a different angle: in her opinion heavy drinking was not at all typical among 
the volunteers of the Brigade, as the Irish did not like wine in particular, and beer on the 
other hand was quit expensive, though.43 In addition, they were not impressed by bull-
fights, could not get used to siestas,44 and complained of boredom as they had been still 
before action. 
After the training in Cáceres the Bandera was sent to the Jarama front, where they ar-
rived on 19 February 1937, after 26 hours on train instead of the expected 5 hours. They 
left for Ciempozuelos from Valdemora on that very day. At Ciempozuelos they found 
themselves in a gun-battle with Falangists from the Canary islands. The fatal misunder-
standing demanded the lives Tom Hyde and Dan Chute.4 In the Irish Press' report the 
incident is referred to as "Irish Brigade loses in action"46, while in the Independent it ap-
peared under the headlines "TWO IRISHMEN KILLED. BRIGADE'S LOSSES AT 
MADRID"47. The latter news does not suggest the volunteers' military defeat. 
The Irish Brigade fought their first battle at Titulcia on 13 March. Though they did not 
manage to capture the town, three Irishmen died in action. Afterwards they were called 
back to Ciempozuelos but were ordered to go back into action next day. However, 
O'Duffy refused this order but interestingly this was not sanctioned. They were moved to 
the La Marañosa sector on 23 March, where there was no active fighting. The most an-
noying inconveniences there were the lack of proper drinking water, continuing attacks of 
the Republican artillery, and according to volunteer McCullagh, "there was no tea, whis-
key, or humour".48 
The link between the Irish Independent and O'Duffy's brigade had been obvious from 
the outbreak of the war. The paper, for instance, had a reporter (Gertrude Gafiney) sent to 
the Brigade in the Spanish Cáceres. Gafiney was privileged as the reporters of the Irish 
Times and the Irish Press were not given permission to approach the members of the Ban-
41 Irish Times, 23 June 1937. 
42 The drinking habits of the Irish volunteers shocked Spaniards. McCabe (quoted by Keogh (1988), 
82.) puts this down to the fact that „in Ireland people take a lenient view of drunkenness and a rigid 
view about sexual excesses. On the whole the reverse is exactly true in Spain". 
43 Stradling (1999), 53. 
44 Keene (2001), 122. 
45 Augusteijn (2001 ), 135. 
46 Irish Press, 24 February 1937. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Augusteijn (2001), 138. 
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dera.''9 In addition, Eoin O'Duffy also favoured the Independent in many respects; it was 
not only once mentioned in the Irish Press that "the General had no statement to make",50 
unlike in the case of the Independent. His letter to recruit volunteers for his 'crusade' was 
published here on 10 August 1936 and on 21 November 1936 his message about their 
aims ("TO FIGHT IN DEFENCE OF CATHOLICISM") was also an exclusive cover in 
the paper. Furthermore, his activities including his trips to Spain and the process of re-
cruiting were also reported in details. As for the aim of the Brigade, the spokesman of 
O'Duffy's recruiting office summarized that it was to "help to put down Communism in 
Spain" and to do so, there was an urgent need "for the breaking-off of all trade and diplo-
matic relations [with the Spanish Republic] until the communist tyranny is ended"51. The 
paper exaggerated the significance of the Brigade in Spanish matters; for instance, when 
on 31 October 1936 the headline was "GENERAL FRANCO THANKS IRELAND-
GRATEFUL FOR ADD"52, the act itself meant much less in practice than the news sug-
gested. Then the fact that on 15 March 1937 the Brigade was reported to have won Ma-
drid Battle53 was much more of an overstatement. The Independent backed O'Duffy and 
his men (referred to the group as "O'Duffy and his great warriors"54) till the end despite 
the criticism - later even of other pro-Nationalist groups - against them.55 Even their arri-
val back in Dublin was commented with warm welcoming words. Rumours began circu-
lating as soon as the beginning of April56. These were not without all foundations, as 
O'Duffy adhered himself to the six-month plan, which could not have been extended 
without difficulties due to the Non-intervention Act of February 1937.57 Both the Irish58 
and the Spanish staff found the Bandera's return to Ireland a reasonable idea. First they 
travelled to Cáceres, then to Lisbon by train on 17 June, and in the end they sailed to Dub-
lin on the Mozambique. Welcome plans for the Brigade were published in the Independ-
ent two days before their arrival59. In the end 633 volunteers arrived on 21 June60 and 
49 Stradling (1999), 229. 
50 Irish Independent, 19 September and 28 November 1936. 
51 Ibid., 13 August 1936. 
52 Ibid., 31 October 1936. 
53 Ibid., 25 March 1937. 
54 Irish Independent, 27 August 1936. 
55 Fine Gael, under the leadership of William Cosgrave, and the Irish Christian Front (ICF) led by 
Patrick Belton. 
56 29 April 1937. 
57 Bell (1969), 157. 
58 O'Duffy in his letter to General Franco (9 April, 1937) asked for the exemption of his men. 
59 Irish Independent, 18 (under the subtitle "Call to the Public") and 19 June 1937. What is more, 
the paper devoted a whole page to the repatriation on 22 June 1937. The headlines, "DUBLIN 
WELCOMES THE IRISH BRIGADE" and "MEMORABLE RECEPTION" were undoubtedly 
overstatements. 
60 The Irish Press gave an exact figure of the number of volunteers to be expected and also of other 
details of their arrival. However, the attention of the paper focused on de Valera's electoral cam-
paign tour in the country. See Irish Press, 18 June 1937. 
Neutral Ireland? Irish Political and Public Reactions to the Spanish Civil War 37 
were received in silence61, because - according to the French chargé d'affaire, François 
Brière - they were expected to fight on till the end.62 The signs of unity and solidarity 
were not perceived: the volunteers split and left the harbour in two groups.63 This ap-
peared in the news of the Irish Times under the headline "THE SPLIT IN THE BRI-
GADE". The volunteers informed the reporter that their mission was only a political cam-
paign and that they "never saw the Reds". They also expressed their disappointment to the 
correspondent of the Irish Press to whom they told, "there was neither religion nor educa-
tion in Spain". The discontent with the leadership also seemed evident from the volun-
teers' remarks: "the responsibility for the loss of our national prestige rests with General 
O'Duffy and a few of his officers"64. The Independent did not mention such issues, 
though. 
Practically the Irish Brigade did not contribute to Franco's victory and the General 
"spent much more on maintaining the Irish Brigade in Spain than he ever received 
back."65 Due to the report of the Irish envoy accredited to Spain, Leopold Kerney, on the 
Irish Brigade, by May 1937 "O'Duffy seemed to have completely lost credit with Franco, 
who [then] looked upon him as a bluffer if not a duffer"66. Nevertheless, he stood up for 
them till the moment when it turned out that they were of no use. Then there were no 
more historical ties or shared sentiments; the Irish were considered only as undisciplined 
soldiers who were to receive their punishment and needed to be got rid of as soon as pos-
sible.67 O'Duffy never admitted that his Brigade failed. 
The Irish supporters of Spanish Republicans 
The most dominant figure of pro-Republicans in Ireland was Frank Ryan. As he was 
far from being anti-clerical, religion was never neglected in his life; he stood for and sym-
bolized the radical Catholic/republican68 tradition. This is why Ryan and his fellow repub-
licans developed good relationship with the Basques, who were well-known religious 
Catholics. José Aguirre, the leader of the Basque Nationalist Party had a high opinion on 
the religious attitudes of the Irish, as he argued, they wanted "a poor church preaching real 
Christianity"69, just as they saw it in Ireland. 
61 The report of the Irish Press contradicts this as due to that „the route was flanked by thousands of 
people, some of whom cheered the Volunteers." See Irish Press, 22 June 1937. 
02 Keene (2001), 127. 
63 Horan led one group, Sean Cunningham the other. 
64 Irish Press, 22 June 1937. 
65 Keene (2001), 128. 
66 Quoted by Keogh (1988), 92. 
67 Keene (2001), 129. 
68 By 'Republicans' in the Irish context I mean the opponents of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 
which divided the island and brought the Irish Free State into existence. 
69 Keogh (1988), 79. 
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Officially the Republican Congress (RC)70 and the Communist Party of Ireland (CPI) 
backed the Spanish Government. The Irish left first sent George Gilmore to Spain in order 
to gain a clearer picture of the Spanish situation and to decide what kind of help may be 
the most useful for Republicans. After he got injured, Ryan took over his duty and started 
to recruit volunteers. Few of them were actually Communist; they did not regard the civil 
war in Spain as a struggle between god and atheism but that between democracy and fas-
cism. Nonetheless the situation was more than complex as trade unions and local councils 
condemned red atrocities71, the Workers Party was not at all concerned with Marxist or 
communist ideology, and their leaders felt strong antipathy towards socialism. The only 
Labour member to mention the war in Spain was William Davin, who - surprisingly 
enough - "urged the Irish government to protest against the anti-clerical atrocities"72. The 
illegal IRA neither supported the cause of the Spanish Republic; they prohibited his mem-
bers from volunteering by saying that their help is needed in Ireland (i.e. in the North).73 
Suggestion was made towards General O'Duffy as well, using the same argument "VOL-
UNTEERS NEEDED IN BELFAST MORE THAN IN SPAIN"74. Referring to the War of 
Independence and the Irish Civil War was a common phenomenon for all sides that were 
interested in the Spanish crisis. What is more, some historians also tend to explain Irish 
interest in the Spanish Civil War with the continuation of the Irish Civil War. As Cronin 
remarked, "the Spanish Civil War provided an opportunity for Italians and the Irish left to 
fight their civil wars on Spanish soil"75. 
Thus the legacy of the Civil War in Ireland was made itself felt in connection with the 
Spanish Civil War as well. Both pro-Nationalists and pro-Republicans referred to the he-
roes of 1916 and used the events of 1916-23 - including Partition - as arguments verify-
ing their moves in the Spanish Civil War. According to Peadar O'Donnell, the co-founder 
of the RC, the Irish Independent (the leading voice of the pro-Franco campaign) was 
"conducting a vicious campaign against the Irish people [...] in 1916, when it denounced 
that Connolly76 be executed; and 1922 when it denounced republicans and pushed for ac-
ceptance of the Treaty. [...] It was the dirtiest kind of yellow journalism"77 Frank Ryan, 
70 The non-militant Republican Congress (RC) was founded by ex-IRA men Frank Ryan, Peadar 
O'Donnell and George Gilmore, and was supported mostly by radical socialists and former mem-
bers of the IRA. The main difference between the programmes of the RC and the IRA was that the 
former placed social reform above the fight against the Treaty. So the greatest challenge for the Irish 
left was - in addition to the lack of public support — the lack of cooperation among left-wing groups 
The ban of the IRA in June 1936 made their situation even more difficult. 
The Irish Independent, the well-known supporter of Nationalists, congratulated to the Irish La-
bour Party and the trade unions for not dealing with 'the case of the left'. See Irish Independent 8 
September 1936. 
12 Irish Independent, 13 September 1936. 
73 Bell (1969), 152. 
74 Irish Press, 27 August 1936. 
75 Cronin (2000), 84. 
76 The Socialist James Connolly, as one of the leaders of the Easter Rising, was executed by the 
British on 12 May 1916. 
77 Cronin (2000), 82. 
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journalist and leader of the Irish volunteers of the International Brigades, also often re-
ferred to the Independent's 'treason' in 1922. In his article on the bombing on Guernica -
which is not signed but is attributed to him - he again referred to "the Independent's ramp 
as compared with its stand in 1916 and 1922 on the 'executions' [...]"78· In addition to 
this, Ryan compared also the Church's attitude towards Spain and its stand in their Civil 
War. He argued, "when the Catholic clergy in Spain identify themselves with he Fascist 
rebellion against the people, it appears to me that [they] turn the churches into barracks, 
and just as I saw no legitimate reason why the Cosgrave government here should be sup-
ported by the Irish bishops in the war 1922-23, so I do not see a legitimate reason why the 
Spanish monarchy or Spanish fascists should be supported by the Spanish bishops to-
day"79. On the other hand the Independent was outraged that "the dead who died for Irish 
freedom would turn in their graves at the suggestion that Irish republicanism is to be com-
pared with Spanish anti-God Communism"80. So the paper was careful not to alienate 
'old-line' Republicans. 
Irish volunteers joined the International Brigades as well, which were set up with the 
help of the Comintern, on the basis of the French communist Thorez's idea.81 Altogether 
35,ООО82 volunteers fought on this side, never more 18,000 at a time. The Irish, all of 
whom were alleged to have "experience of warfare in Ireland"83 were placed into the Brit-
ish Battalion. The Brits were led by a former Black and Tan, Captain George Nathan, who 
had also been the member of the Dublin Castle Murder Gang in the Anglo-Irish War. His 
past made it difficult to get on well with the Irish unit84, thus later he was replaced by the 
Irish Kit Conway. However, the actual leader of the Irish was Ryan, who happened to be 
an experienced journalist (the co-editor of the republican An Phoblacht). But as he was 
not a convinced communist, he was not trusted by the leadership of the Brigades.85 It was 
in April 1938 that he was captured at the Aragon front and was not released until 1940. 
The Irish supporters of the Spanish Government came mostly from big cities, with 
workers' background; as for their political beliefs, they were either IRA or RC members. 
Stradling refers to them as the "Communist Crusade", as opposed to the "Catholic Cru-
sade" of the Irish Brigade. This was, however, far from being the real case, since pro-
Republicans included idealists, intellectuals as well as adventurers, but the majority was 
motivated by anti-fascist believes. In addition, domestic political issues also contributed to 
the emergence of this Brigade. As the Blueshirts openly supported General Franco's side, 
this served as the main motivating force to fight against the Insurgents. Despite criticisms, 
the Irish members of the International Brigades were not anti-religious; Ryan himself also 
78 Cronin (2000), 111. 
79 Keogh (1988), 79. 
80 Irish Independent, 6 November 1936. 
81 Anthony Beevor, A spanyol polgárháború (Budapest: Európa, 2002), 263. 
82 Data concerning the number of volunteers vary according to sources. Compare Beevor (2002), 
264, and Stradling (1999), 145. 
83 Stradling (1999), 160. 
84 In the end he was just as hateful for the Irish volunteers of the International Brigades as O'Duffy. 
See ibid., 153. 
85 Ibid., 160. 
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attended mass eveiy Sunday while he was in Madrid (this of course was first-class propa-
ganda at the same time, as Stradling highlights it).86 Spanish Catholics were not at all as 
pious as Irish volunteers would have expected that; Peadar O'Donnell, writer and the co-
leader of the RC on his visit to Spain observed that "Spanish Catholics do not seem to 
regard the Church with any of the owe so marked in Ireland. To them it is a sociable sort 
of place for talk as freely as in a café"87. 
The Irish team consisted of 150 republicans, 80 of whom left Dublin on 11 December. 
Their departure was reported in both the Irish Press and the Irish Times™ According to 
the Times, "the men left quietly and without any demonstration. 40 of them actually trav-
elled on the same ship to Liverpool with General O'Dufly's volunteers"89. Frank Ryan, 
their leader made a statement to the reporter of the Irish Press: "The Republican contin-
gent besides being a very efficient fighting force, every member of it having been in ac-
tion - is also a demonstration. It is a demonstration of sympathy of revolutionary Ireland 
with the Spanish people in their fight against international Fascism. It is also a reply to the 
involvement of Irish Fascism in the war against the Spanish Republic". He concluded by 
emphasizing, "We want to show that there is a close bond between the democracies of 
Ireland and Spain". This statement underlies the fact that Irish pro-Republicans were not 
thinking in terms of religion but democracy. 
Altogether about 70 of them died in action, including the young poet, Charles Don-
nelly. Their base was appointed in Albacete, where international volunteers were trained. 
Here problems occurred in connection with oily food; dysentery was not uncommon 
among them. After training they moved to the village of Madrigueras, which was the cen-
tre of the XV Brigade (i.e. the British Battalion). The Irish and the British were put to-
gether because of linguistic reasons; this proved to be a serious mistake later on. The Irish 
were put into action already on 28 and 29 December, however, without success, since they 
could not take the village of Lopera. The Battle of Jarama was their first significant ac-
tion, where the British Battalion stopped Franco's troops. The operations of 12-14 Febru-
ary were thus successful, but with losses: only 50 of the original 80 Irish volunteers stayed 
alive. In this battle the Irish were already split into two groups: the members of the Abra-
ham Lincoln90 and the British Government. The reason for the split was the disagreement 
with, and hostility towards British officers. The majority of the Irish volunteers, as former 
IRA-men, found it very difficult to follow the orders of an Englishman.91 Ryan's New 
Years message, 'To all Irish Comrades' was intended to ease nerves; than he reminded 
everyone that Fascism is the main enemy and that the International Brigades cannot be 
divided by conflicts.92 
86 Ibid., 194. 
87 O'Donnell (1937), 23. 
88 Unlike the Independent, the Irish Press reported on Irish volunteers fighting on both sides in 
Spain. 
85 Irish Times, 14 December 1936. 
90 By the end of the battle of Brúñete, July 1937, there had been hardly any Irish survivors left. See 
Stradling (1999), 172. 
91 Ibid., 153. 
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The withdrawal of the International Brigades began after Negrin's speech of 21 Sep-
tember 1938. The Irish arrived back in Dublin on 11 November and the 44 returning vol-
unteers were received by some 200 people at Molesworth Hall. The event did not have 
much press coverage in Dublin. 
As far as the press was concerned, small socialist weeklies like The Worker and the 
Irish Democrat commented on Spanish events from the Republican point of view. After 
March 1937, Peadar O'Donnell became the editor of the latter, which guaranteed republi-
can and socialist attitudes as he used to be the co-founder of the RC as well. Nevertheless, 
the low number of their circulation and their readers prevented them from gathering a 
considerable mass base for the Spanish Republic. 
Non-interventionists 
The Irish government found itself in a difficult position at the outbreak of the Spanish 
Civil War as they had to consider more than one factors in their foreign policy. These 
were the relationships with Britain (and the Commonwealth), the Vatican93, and the 
League of Nations (as an international meeting-place). During the years of the Spanish 
Civil War, the Fianna Fáil government loosened its ties with Britain94. Although still be-
ing the member of the Commonwealth, the Free State took significant steps towards total 
independence. Paying much attention to British case did not mean pushing international 
issues such as the Spanish Civil War into the background, on the contrary. By performing 
autonomous foreign policy in Spanish matters, the Irish government indicated that inde-
pendence from Britain was just a matter of time. But the Fine Gael opposition kept on 
bringing up the constitutional question even in connection with the Spanish Civil War, in 
order to prove that de Valera will not manage to bring an independent Irish republic into 
existence. According to J. Dillon, the Commonwealth "would consolidate Democracy 
against dictatorship" those days when "the light of democracy and freedom was being 
quenched throughout the nations of Europe". He went on saying that "if the independence 
and sovereignty of the country were to be maintained against the threats from all sides, 
and if the unity of the country were to be achieved in their generation, it must be done on 
the basis of membership of the Commonwealth of Nations"95. 
The Free State officially adopted the policy of non-intervention in the Spanish conflict. 
Many articles appeared in the Irish Pres/ explaining the nature of non-intervention, 
93 The policy of the Vatican was a crucial point in the Free State's handling of the Spanish matter, 
especially in the field of diplomatic recognition. 
94 First, the reference to the Crown was removed from the Constitution in 1936. Then in July 1937, a 
new Constitution was passed in the Dáil (which brought the independent Ireland, Eire into exis-
tence), and finally in spring 1938 the Anglo-Irish Agreement, which dealt with the status of ports in 
Ireland, was signed. The importance of the latter grew under the years of the Second World War. 
95 Irish Independent, 9 August 1936. 
96 The Irish Press was founded in 1931, a year before Fianna Fáil come to power. Its curiosity lies in 
the fact that one of its founding-members was Eamon de Valera, the leader of the government be-
tween 1932 and 1948. In spite of the obvious link between the paper and the party, it was empha-
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namely that this served the best both Spanish interests and European peace. In connection 
with the Spanish Civil War, the paper "did not hide its concern for the victims of atrocities 
[...] but reported the conflict in a considerably more even-handed manner than the Irish 
Independent".91 
The birth of the non-intervention policy in Ireland dates back to 14 August 1936, when 
Pierre Guerlet, the French representative in Dublin was contacted that the Irish govern-
ment accepted the French appeal for non-intervention. On 25 August the Dáil took further 
steps and adhered to the ban on arms and ammunition to Spain. The following day the 
Irish Press issued a report on the position of de Valera's government and the importance 
of the non-intervention policy. Besides emphasising the main goals of non-intervention, 
and that this was the policy to serve best the interests of both Spanish interests and Euro-
pean peace, it clarified that 
"the government of the Saorstát Éireann, in common with the Irish people and the 
Christian world, are profoundly shocked by the tragic events that may have been 
taking place in Spain and by the excesses by which these events are reported to be 
accompanied. Their sympathy goes out to the great Spanish people in their terrible 
suffering. They earnestly hope that peace may soon be restored, and they would 
gladly participate in any practical effort directed toward that end. To those public 
bodies, however, and to others who have requested the government to sever dip-
lomatic relations with the Spanish government the government of the Saorstát 
Eireann would point out that diplomatic relations are primarily between States 
rather than Governments, and that the severance of diplomatic relations between 
two countries would serve no useful purpose at the present time."98 
It was not surprising to read the criticism of the Opposition in the Irish Independent, 
namely that with adhering to the non-intervention policy, the Free State Government 
"placed the communists on the same level as the defensceless of Christianity". They did 
not regard non-intervention to be official as it did not "appear to have the force of law", 
unlike the "Italian-Abyssinian conflict where sanctions against Italy took the form of a 
Bill" . As the Dáil was not in session at that time, there was no prospect of taking such 
measures then. 
The Non-intervention Committee was set up in London the next month, where the 
Irish were represented by John Whelan Dulanty, the Irish high commissioner in London. 
Like other small states, the Free State insisted on neutrality and non-intervention in order 
to minimize the conflicts in Europe that may count as threats to peace in the country. Ac-
cording to Bell100, Irish participation in the Committee's work was negligible, not because 
sised in the first edition (5 November 1931) that the Irish Press was "not the organ of an individual, 
a group, or a party [but would be] a national organ in all that term conveys." 
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of the inefficiency of the Irish government or the delegate, but because administration and 
decision-making in the 26-membered Committee showed very slow progress101. Fine Gael 
surprisingly did not oppose the principle of non-intervention and thus the establishment of 
the NIC; unlike Belton from ICF, who had a low opinion on the NIC; he said it "com-
posed of the Radical, Socialist and Communist nations in Europe"102. 
In spite of domestic criticism, the Free State adhered to the principles and orders of 
the Committee; in the first year the country contributed to the work of the Committee with 
L 7,184. The Dáil passed the resolution about the contribution on 9 April 1937. According 
to the Irish Times, the money was for the "scheme of observation of the Spanish frontiers 
by land and sea", that is, for the Control Scheme, which came into operation later that 
month, on 22 April 1937. 
As the reports of the Irish Press mostly reflected the views of de Valera govern-
ment103, it is not surprising to find several references to the Vatican's Spanish policy be-
tween 1936 and 1939, as de Valera always considered the Pope's steps determinant. The 
paper was aware of the critics of non-intervention; it reminded them to de Valera's state-
ment that diplomatic relations are primarily between states and not governments, always 
referring to the standing point of the Vatican. The first article on the issue, entitled "THE 
VATICAN AND SPANISH CIVIL WAR. THE POPE'S ANXIETY", appeared on 6 Au-
gust 1936. However, despite the arguments of the government and the Irish Press, the 
opposition often, and when it suited its own purpose, did not hesitate to be more Catholic 
than the Pope.104 Thus de Valera let his paper adopt a "moderately pro-Catholic - but not 
pro-Francoist - sympathy".105 
All in all, non-intervention served the interests of the government the most in the 
Spanish conflict. During the years of the Spanish Civil War, the de Valera administration 
managed to strengthen their position in domestic political grounds as well. The results of 
the 1937 elections also reflected that the government's decisions (both in domestic and 
foreign policy) were supported by the majority of the Irish population. De Valera himself 
referred to this in his speech in the Dáil on 19 February 1937 when he said "the Govern-
ment's policy was the policy accepted by the vast majority of the Irish people [and added 
that] he had no doubt about that"106. Fianna Fáil won, the ICF-leader Belton lost even his 
seat in the Dáil, unlike Ryan, who got in as a candidate of a United Front. The results 
proved that "the Irish simply refused to become involved in crusades to save either Chris-
tianity or democracy"107 and also that "other matters such as the persistent crisis and the 
101 Keogh (1988), 67. 
102 Irish Press, 19 February 1937. 
103 However, naturally there were tensions in the Irish Press itself as well, not everyone supported 
de Valera with all his might; Aodh Blacam, for instance, was openly pro-Franco. His pamphlet, For 
God and Spain is a good example for pro-Nationalist voices. 
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controversy over the new Constitution, had a greater impact"108. Nevertheless it did not 
mean that Irish society was indifferent to the Spanish Civil War but rather that this was 
not something which could make people withdraw confidence from the ministry. So Irish 
people were very much aware of the advantage of the non-intervention policy: there had 
been no open clashes between the supporters of the two (the Blueshirts and the IRA) Para-
military groups in Ireland. So de Valera did manage to get rid of those who posed threat to 
political stability in 1933-34 as Spain was an excellent way to "get rid of some of [the] 
wild men from both varieties."109 And what is more, the country had actively participated 
in the maintenance of European peace (in spite of the obvious failure of the Non-
intervention Committee), which was a prestige for a small state to have her voice heard as 
effectively as did Ireland. 
According to Bell, "Spain had never become a central issue in Irish affairs and other 
crises, other news, other disasters, attracted the attention о the press as well as the politi-
cians and priests"110 In my view, the attention that the Irish public, politics and press paid 
to the Spanish crisis should not be underestimated because it proved that the country was 
not isolated from European events in spite of her main problem, Partition. Thus non-
intervention policy in Ireland was not at all equal to indifference in Spanish matters be-
tween 1936 and 1939. 
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